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lN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate
of
JACK EDDY, aka JACK P. EDDY, aka

Case No.
1216'5

JACK POLLARD EDDY, Deceased.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SHARON HALL
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a probate proceeding in which the deceased's
former wife and the former wife's daughter by a prior
marriage each claim the right to distribution of the deceased's estate pursuant to the terms of the will. Decedent's
brother, his sole heir at law, claims the estate by intestacy.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, entered a
Judgment, based upon stipulated facts, in which the estate
was awarded to Sharon Hall, daughter by a prior marriage
of the deceased's former wife.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Sharon Hall seeks an affirmation of the
lower court judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts set forth in appellants' briefs
are essentially accurate and respondent hereby adopts these
statements and by this reference makes them a part hereof
as though set forth herein at length.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT APPELLANT, R 0 B E RT A E D DY,
WAIVED AND RELINQUISHED HER RIGHT
TO TAKE UNDER THE WILL OF J.A:CK EDDY
BY REASON OF HER STIPULATION IN THE
DIVORCE DEOREE.
It has long been the established law in California that

a spouse may relinquish inheritance rights in the prospec·
tive estate of the other spouse by agreement between the
parties, e.g., by a property settlement agreement entered
into in connection with a divorce.
Thus, in Estate of Patterson, 46 Cal. App. 415 (189
Pac. 483), husband orally agreed to relinquish his inherit·
able interest in wife's estate in consideration of the transfer
to him by wife of certain land standing in their joint
names. Subsequently, wife died intestate and husband filed
a petition asking for letters of administration. The trial
court denied his petition finding that:
"He was not entitled to administer said estate for
the reason that he was not entitled to succeed to the
personal estate of decedent since petitioner had dur·
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ing the lifetime of decedent entered into a valid
contract with her whereunder he had relinquished,

released and waived all rights, including his inheritable rights and interest in and to the property and
estate of deceased." (Emphasis supplied.)
The appellate court in affirming quickly disposed of
the issue which is here presented and then turned its attention to the more troublesome question of whether such an
agreement must be in writing to be valid and enforceable.
The decision insofar as it is pertinent to the instant proceeding is crystal clear :

"It follows, of course, from said code provisions
(California Civil Code Sections 158, 159 & 160)
that a husband and wife may enter into an agreement whereby one or the other, or both, may relinquish his or her inheritable interest in the estate
of the other. This proposition, however, it not disputed here, nor could it be, since the disposal of one's
inheritable interest in the estate of another is no
less an act involving a contract or an engagement
respecting property than where such act involved
the transfer of property in tangible form or property having a present tangible existence."
In the case of In re Davis, 106 Cal. 453 (39 Pac. 756),
cited in Patterson, husband and wife entered into "articles
of separation" whereby they agreed to divide their property
and "relinquish all claim of every nature upon the property
of each other then owned or thereafter to be acquired." The
parties then separated and continued to live apart until the
death of husband, whereupon the widow applied (through
a nominee) for letters of administration. The trial court
denied the nominee's petition and the appeal followed. The
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appellate court affirmed, holding that:

"The right of the widow to letters depended on
whether she was entitled to inherit any of her husband's property. We think it clear from the evidence that she was not ... The agreement of sepa.
ration entered into between decedent and his wife
was a contract which they were competent to make ,
with one another and one, in fact, expressly author- i
ized by statute (California Civil Code Sections 158
& 159). It rested upon good and sufficient consideration, and was fully carried out. The obvious purpose was not only to definitely sever the property
rights of the parties, but mutually to relinquish and '
1
release all inheritable interest of each other in the
property and estate of the other."
Similarly, in the Estate of Edelman, 148 Cal. 233 (82 '
Pac. 962), husband and wife entered into a separation
agreement whereunder each party "waived all right and
claim of inheritance to succeed to any part of the property
of the other." Upon the subsequent death of wife her will
was offered for probate and husband appeared as a
contestant alleging that the will was executed by wife
under undue influence. Upon the trial of the matter the 1
court found that the separation agreement was valid and 1
binding and operated to deprive husband of any interest
in wife's estate as well as any standing to contest the will.
On appeal the order dismissing husband's contest was up·
held:
". . . Proof on the part of the proponent of the will
of a separation agreement between the husband and
wife, whereby they each waived and released all
right and claim of inheritance or to succeed to nu'·
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property of the other and which had been lived up
to by both parties during the lifetime of the wife,
is sufficient to show a want of interest in the husband to maintain the contest ... "
There appears to be no Utah case in point and the
question herein presented may be one of first impression
insofar as Utah is concerned. However, the great weight
of authority is in accord with the position taken by the
California cases cited hereinabove. This is clearly established in 26A Corpus Juris Secundum, Section 58b, pg. 636:
"In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, a husband or wife may waive, release or be
estopped to assert rights of inheritance in the estate
of the other by certain acts or conduct on his or her
part during the marriage. Thus, although a rule
to the contrary prevails in some jurisdictions, as a
general rule a husband or wife may waive his or
her inheritable rights in the estate of the other by
an express postnuptial agreement." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The general rule has been enunciated and followed in
California, as we have seen, and in Kentucky, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Illinois, New York, Indiana, Kansas,
Pennsylvania, Ohio and many other jurisdictions.

Appellant Roberta Eddy has failed to cite a single case
or authority which sup7Jorts her position in this regard.
In Re Crane's Estate, 6 Cal. 2d 218 (56 P. 2d 476), is
not inconsistent with the well-established rule in California
and the great weight of authority elsewhere. In Crane the
property settlement failed to set forth any renunciation of
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the right to inherit from each other's estate. Instead, the
contract provided that:
"the parties had settled, adjusted and forever determined ... their respective rights to any inheritance ... in the estate of either."
In the absence of any express renunciation, the court
held that there was no waiver of the widow's right to a
bequest under the terms of the will, stating:
"But, as if by intention, there is a total failure to
set forth in the contract any renunciation of the
right to accept and receive future gifts to one from
the other whether by way of gift inter vivos, by
devise, or by bequest. As applied to such gift, we
find in the agreement no basis for an estoppel
against appellant with respect to the legacy claimed
in the will."
To the same effect is Estate of Hadsell, 120 Cal. App.
2d 270 (260 P. 2d 1021) (1953) in which the court, citing
Crane, held :
"Unless a property settlement agreement specifically renounces the right, such agreement does not
estop a surviving husband or wife to take under the
will of the other."

In our case, the stipulation set forth in the Eddy di·
vorce decree does indeed contain a specific renunciation of
the right to inherit:
"It is adjudged that pursuant to stipulation, both
plaintiff and defendant waive any and all right to
inherit the estate of the other at the time of his or
her death, or to take property from the other by
devise or bequest ... "
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Bennett v. Forrest, 150 Pac. 2d 416 (Cal. 1944), also

cited by appellant Roberta Eddy is not at all in point. In
Bennett, the probate court had found that the property
settlement agreement (wherein husband and wife had
waived and relinquished all right to inherit) was not in
effect at the time of decedent's death because the spouses
had reconciled after entering into the agreement. Therefore, the only question before the appellate court was
whether the probate court's finding with regard to this
issue was res adjudicata.
Thus, we see that under the great weight of authority
m this country appellant Roberta Eddy has waived and
relinquished her rights under the will of Jack Eddy and,
further, that she has failed to give expression to any contrary view.
POINT II.
THE DIVORCE AND PROPERTY ·SETTLEMENT DID NOT RESULT IN A REVOCATION
OF THE WILL UNDER THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
Petitioner, James Eddy, cites the recent (1966) case
of Luff v. Luff, 359 Fed. 2nd 235, as authority which
this Court should follow on the issue of revocation
by implication of law. A careful examination of Luff v.
Luff, and the applicable statutory law of the District of
Columbia, will reveal that Luff cannot be followed by the
courts in the State of Utah.
The language of the applicable District of Columbia

statute enumerating the usual means of revoking a will is,
ebsentially, similar to Section 74-1-19, Utah Code Annotated. Both statutes provided that revocation can be accomplished by a later will or codicil, or by burning, cancelling, tearing 01· obliterating. But at this point the simih1xity between the two j tcrisdictions encls.
Utah law further ]J1'ovides two particula1· cn·cumstances ·where the will is co11c!usively deemed revoked. The
firnt, where, afte:t making a will, the testator manies and
has issue of such marriage and the wife or issue surviye
him (Section 74-1-24 Utah Code Annotated 1953). The second, where, after making a will, the testatOl' manies and the
wife survives him (Section 7'1-1-25 Utah Code Annotated
1953). However, the Disti-ict of Columbia has no statutes
setting forth the particulDx cfrcumstances under which reYocation by implication will be recognized. Thus, in Lnff the
District of Columbia court was free to apply the common
law doctrine of implied i·evocation to any situation which it
felt fell ·within the rationale of the doctrine. This freedom
was clearly expressed by the majority opinion, as follows:
"And where implied revocation has been recognize!,
and the circumstances of its application left to the
courts to decide, as here, we turn to decisional and
statutory law in other jurisdictions for guidance as
to whether a divorce with property settlement is
such change of condition or circumstances as brings
the doctrine into play." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is at once apparent that the "circumstances of the

application of the doctrine of implied revocation" have nol
been left to the Utah Courts to decide since the legislature

has lii1i ·Led t1-1e application of the doctrine to the change of
circurnstance;; ciescribed in Sections 74-1-24 and 74-1-25 of
the Utah Code. This is in accordance with the rule discussed in 18 A. L. R. 2d 697, which treats with the subject
"Diuon:e or annzdrnent as affecting will previously exer-1ded Ii !i /, 1Lsband or wife." The general rule, as set forth
i11 ::Leo A11twtatio;1 at Pg. 703, is as follows:
"Where the statute prescribes certain methods foJ.·
revocation of ·wills and contains no exception permitting implied i·evocation, the divorce may be held
not to reYoke the prior will, even though the statute
p1·ovides that other subsequent events such as mar1-iage or Girth of child shall revoke a prior will, the
rnUl't taldng the position that the statutory methods
of 1 evocation are exclusive." (Emphasis supplied.)
Counsel for James Eddy is in error when he states at
Pg. 12 of his brief that:
"All parties apparently agree that under common
law divorce would result in revocation implied by
la v\'."

Respondent, for one, disagrees with this conclusion for
the ve1·y simple reason that divorce was virtually unheard
of at common law. The real question here is whether the
common law doctrine of implied revocation should be applicable to divorce. Page on Wills, Section 21.101 discusses
this very point:
"Divorce was so rare before modern legislation that
it may well be treated as a new case, fairly involving
the question of the application of the existing principles of common law and ecclesiastical law to a
situation which could rarely, if ever, be presented
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under the old law for specific adjudication ... The
unwillingness of the courts to treat this as a revocation is due in a large part to the fact that testator
frequently intends his will to remain in effect in
spite of the divorce ... The courts are thus driven
to a rule which represents the probable intention
of the average testator. It seems very doubtful
whether the probable intention of the average testator that a prior will should not remain in force
under such circumstances is so clear as to justify
the courts in adding this as a new class of revocation by operation of law." (Emphasis supplied.)
POINT III.
JAMES EDDY HAS BEEN DISINHERITED
UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE
WILL.
Paragraph Fifth of the will has two aspects, both
leading to the same result.
In the first sentence of Paragraph Fifth the testator
states that he has

"intentionally and with full knowledge omitted to
provide for my heirs who may be living at the timt
of my death ... " (Emphasis supplied.)
The second sentence consists of a typical "in terrorem"
clause which applies to
"any person, whether a beneficiary under this
or not mentioned herein, who shall contest this will
or object to any of the provisions thereof."
James Eddy has, of necessity, limited his argument to
the applicability of the "in terrorem" clause to his posture
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in this case. He contends that what he is doing does not
really amount to a "contest" of the will and, therefore, the
in terrorem clause does not apply to him. Ergo, he has not
been disinherited.
James Eddy's argument in this regard is quite transparent. Assuming, arguendo, that his contention is valid
and that he has not been disqualified from taking under
the will by the operation of the in terrorem clause, the fact
remains that he has been disinherited by virtue of the first
sentence of Paragraph Fifth quoted above.
Parenthetically, if we accept the definition of a "contest" as "any legal proceeding which is designed to thwart
the testator's wishes as stated in his will" as per In Re
Holtermann's Estate, 206 Cal. App. 2d 460, 23 Cal. Rptr.
685 (cited by appellant James Eddy at Pg. 22 of his brief),
then James Eddy has, indeed, contested the will. For, if he
has his way, the estate will go by intestacy to himself as
the heir of Jack Eddy - and the testator's wishes as stated
in his last will and testament will have been thwarted with
a vengeance.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT CORRIDCTLY HELD
THAT IT WAS THE TE STATOR'S INTENTION, AS ASCERTAINED FROM THE FOUR
CORNERS OF THE WILL, THAT RESPONDENT SHARON HALL SHOULD TAKE UNDER HIS WILL AND BE ENTITLED TO DISTRIBUTION OF HIS ESTATE IN THE EVENT
1

OF ANY CONTINGENCY THAT RENDERED
THE PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARY IN CAP ABLE
OF OR DISQUALIFIED FROM SUCH DISTRIBUTION.
The cases cited by appellants correctly state the law
as it applies to certain particular factual situations, but they
have limited applicability to the facts of the instant case.
Thus, In Re Beales Estate, 117 Utah 189, 214 Pac. 2d
525, In Re Kincaid's Estate, 3044 Pac. 2d 85, Glover v.
Reynolds, 135 N. J. Eq. 113, 37 A. 2d 90, Estate of Sowash,
62 Cal. App. 512, 217 Pac. 123, and In Re Searl's Estate, 20
Wash. 2d 230, 186 Pac. 2d 913, all have this much in com·
mon with the instant case: They all deal with the effect of
the failure of a condition precedent on the vesting of the
succeeding estate. However, in none of these cases was
there a renunciation by the principal beneficiary. Thus,
the question which is central to this appeal - whether the
testator intended the alternative beneficiary to take in any
and ei,ery event which terminated the precedent estate Yrns not dealt with since it did not arise.
In our case, the renunciation by the former wife,
Roberta Eddy, requires an examination into the doctrine
of acceleration as well as an analysis of the testator's intent
in this regard.
The great bulk of renunciation cases deals with the ac·
celeration of remainders after the prior life estate has te1"
minated for one reason or another before the death of the
life tenant. The most familiar case of acceleration is where

the
has been given a life estate by the will of her husband and she renounces the will and elects to take her
dower or statutory allowance instead. In such case the remainder is accelerated to take effect as if the wife had
predeceased her husband. This result obtains as a consequence of the rule of construction which arises from the
inferred intent of the testator. However, where the instrument manifests a contrary intent the rule yields to the
intention of the testator as shown by the instrument. See
164 A. L. R. 1433, at pg. 1434.
There is a paucity of cases which treat with the effect
of renunciation of estates in fee. As a consequence of this
dea1th, there is no rule of construction by which the testator's intent may be inferred where the estate renounced is
in fee. But, rule of construction or no, if the intention of
the testator can be ascertained from the "four corners" of
the will, this intention must be given effect. Thus, in
Broaddus v. Park College, 180 S. W. 2d 268, cited by appellant James Eddy at Pg. 17 of his brief, the court states:
"The cardinal rule for construction of wills is to
ascertain the testator's intention from the language
of his will, - not one part alone but from the 'four
corners' thereof, - and so to construe it, if possible,
as to give effect to all its provisions."
"When the intent of its maker is discovered, the
will is solved, unless that intent runs counter to an
inflexible rule of law or public policy."
In Broaddus, the testator gave a bequest of $5,000.00
to his wife on condition she survive him, otherwise to his
two nieces. The wife did, in fact, survive testator but she
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renounced the bequest. The sole question before the court
was posed as follows:
"So the question to be resolved is, did the testator
intend that respondents should receive the $5,000.00
in event the wife renounced the will?" (Emphasis
supplied.)
The court, after a careful review of the language of
the will and surrounding facts and circumstances, came to
the conclusion that the testator did not so intend. It should
be clearly noted at this point that the language of the annotation, 157 A. L. R. 1104 (in which Broaddus is cited)
which appears on ,pg. 17 of appellant James Eddy's brief:
"Renunciation on the part of the original beneficiary was not equivalent to his death ... and so the
alternative beneficiary was not entitled to take as
substituted legatee or devisee"

is totally misleading if the reader accepts it as a general
rule of construction that "renunciation is not equivalent to
death." As we have observed, supra, there is no rule of
construction in this area and one must look to the will itself
in order to ascertain whether the testator intended the
alternative beneficiary to take in the event of renunciation
as well as in the case of death.
Thus, the same annotation, 157 A. L. R. 1104, discusses
the case of Fletcher v. Cotton, 81 N. H. 243, 123 A. 889,
where the court held that the testator did intend that the
alternative beneficiary should take following a renunciation by the principal beneficiary.
In Fletcher, the testator, John Cotton, bequeathed his
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homestead and household furniture to his wife and "in
case my wife should not survive me or should die intestate
then to my daughter." (Although he referred to her as his
"daughter" she was not, in fact, related to testator nor
was she legally adopted.) The wife survived testator but
renounced her rights under the will and elected to take her
statutory one-half interest in the estate in fee instead of
her right of dower and her homestead right.
Thereafter, wife died testate bequeathing her one-half
interest in the real property to the "daughter." The "daughter" also claimed the other half of the homestead under the
will of testator John Cotton. The defendants contended
that since testator's wife survived him and died testate,
the condition precedent had not been satisfied and, therefore, the "daughter" could not take under the will and the
other undivided half interest should fall into the residuum
of the estate. The court disagreed with this contention and
held for the plaintiff "daughter." The pertinent language
of the decision follows :
"The intention of the testator, however, is to be determined not alone by the literal meaning of the
language employed, but is to be gathered from the
words used read in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, such as the subject matter of his
gift and the relations of the testator to the persons
who are the objects of his bounty . . . The testator
had no children. The plaintiff from her early childhood until her marriage four years before the death
of the testator, had been a member of his family,
and had been reared and treated by testator and his
wife as their child. While the plaintiff was neither
related nor legally adopted, she held in the minds
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and affection of the foster parents the position
usually occupied by a daughter ... The wording of
the will disposes a genuine solicitude on the part of
the testator that the homestead, together with all
the effects associated with the home, should remain
in the immediate family. This appears to have been
his primary purpose. The homestead, etc. were to
be the widow's if she survived him. If not, then
they were to be the daughter's. If the widow did
survive him, still they were to be the daughter's,
unless the widow should otherwise direct by will ...
He thought that he had sufficiently expressed this
idea when he made the devise to the daughter 'in
case my wife should not survive me or should die
intestate.' Had he anticipated the widow might, by
exercising her election under the
place an
undivided interest in the home beyond her testamentary control, he doubtless would have expressed
his thought with greater precision. His purpose,
however, is not in serious doubt. The intestacy of
his widow as to the homestead place was what was
in his mind when he said, 'or should die intestate.'
Upon the filing of her waiver the widow ceased to
have any testamentary power over that undivided
half of the homestead ... and as to such undivided
half, she then became intestate within the meaning
of testator's will as truly as if she had then died
without a will. Accordingly, upon the filing of the
widow's waiver, such undivided half passed to the
plaintiff under the will of John Cotton.'' (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, we see in Fletcher v. Cotton, the court has construed the will to give effect to the testator's intentions and
the renunciation by the wife of her interest under the will
was properly allowed to accelerate the daughter's interest
even though the express conditions precedent to her taking
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had not been met. This is precisely the situation with which
we are faced in the present case.
Now, at long last, we come to the facts of the instant
case. Respondent readily concedes that if the will merely
provided for a gift over to Sharon Hall if Roberta Eddy
predeceased testator, Roberta's renunciation would result
in intestacy since in such case there would be no way to
ascertain the testator's intentions in the event of renunciation. These provisions in the will, standing alone, would
present a situation closely analogous to the factual situation presented by In Re Larnpshire, 57 Misc. 2nd 332, 292
N. Y. S. 2d 578, cited by appellant James Eddy at Pg. 18
of his brief. The court in Lampshire correctly observed,
based upon the facts of that case, that it
"should not make a new will based on speculation
as to what the testator might have intended."
However, Paragraph Fifth of our will adds an important and distinguishing dimension to the will. By disinheriting his heirs in said paragraph, testator has, by implication, expressed his intention that his stepdaughter,
respondent Sharon Hall, should take under the will in the
event of any termination of Roberta Eddy's precedent interest. This conclusion is virtually inescapable since a contrary interpretation of testator's intention in this regard
leads to the anomalous conclusion that the testator intended
that those whom he had specifically and unqualifiedly disinherited should, under certain circurnstances, inherit the
estate. Surely, such an absurd result should not be counten-
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anced by this Court, especially where a rational alternative
is available.
POINT V.
THE WILL SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN
SUCH MANNER AS TO AVOID INTESTACY
AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENTION OF THE TESTATOR.
It is a universal principle which is followed in every
jurisdiction including the State of Utah that such interpretation should, if possible, be placed upon the provisions of
a will as will prevent intestacy, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose
of his whole estate.
74-2-10 Utah Code Annotated 1953, California Probate
Code, Section 102.
Furthermore, a will must be construed according to the
intention of the testator, expressed therein, and this inten·
tion must be given effect as far as possible.
74-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, California Probate
Code, Section 101.
A very recent California case, Estate of Benton, 4 Cai.
App. 3rd 575, 85 Cal. Reptr. 633 ( 1970), demonstrates the
current attitude of the courts in the application of these
principles.
In Benton, the will provided that decedent's 2500
shares of stock in his company were to go to his daughter
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and appellant (who had been hired by decedent to manage
and eventually control the company), provided that the
daughter and appellant executed a written agreement which
was to provide that on the death of either the shares willed
to the one dying should pass to the other.
The daughter refused to execute the agreement and
the trial court found that this resulted in a failure of both
bequests and that the entire estate should be distributed to
the widow.
The trial court stated that it was the testator's intent
that the bequests were conditioned upon mutual assumption
of the obligations and that since the daughter did not agree
to assume the required obligation, the bequest to both the
daughter and appellant failed.
The appellate court noted three faults with this conclusion:
It results in intestacy as to the shares, whereas the
opposite should be assumed.
1.

2. The giving of the shares to the widow makes the
Will's expressions inoperative.
3.

The widow receives shares reserved by the testator

for others.

The court thereupon concluded that a reasonable interpretation of the will is that the daughter's refusal does
not affect the bequest of 1250 shares to appellant, provided
that he fulfilled all of the conditions required of him by the
terms of the will. The appellate court pointed out that this
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interpretation gave meaning to all of the provisions of the
will and avoided intestacy as to any of the testator's property.
The analogy to our case is clear. By interpreting the
will so as to give effect to the testator's intention that respondent Sharon Hall should take under the will in the
event of any termination of Roberta Eddy's precedent estate, intestacy is avoided, the provisions of the will remain
operative, and the disinherited heir, James Eddy, does not
receive the estate which the testator had reserved for his
step-daughter Sharon Hall.
CONCLUSION
Roberta Eddy has waived her right to inherit; James
Eddy has been disinherited. Under these circumstances,
the clearly expressed intention of Jack Eddy to bequeath
his estate to his step-daughter Sharon Hall should not be
thwarted, especially where this intention can be given effect
in accordance with the well-established principles which
have been discussed hereinabove.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY and
HAROLD DROOZ
Attorneys for Respondent
Sharon Hall
404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

